The recent United States military intervention in Venezuela, which resulted in the capture of President Nicolás Maduro and his wife and their transfer to the United States for trial, has reignited a fundamental debate in international law. President Donald Trump’s assertion that the United States will “run” Venezuela until a new government is installed raises profound legal and political questions about state sovereignty, the use of force, and the durability of the international legal order.

At the center of this controversy is Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, which prohibits states from using or threatening force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state. This rule, established after the devastation of the Second World War, was designed to prevent unilateral military action and to protect weaker states from domination by more powerful ones.

Under international law, the use of force is lawful only in limited circumstances: when authorized by the United Nations Security Council, when exercised in self-defense against an actual or imminent armed attack, or when carried out with the clear consent of the lawful government of the state concerned. In the case of Venezuela, there was no Security Council authorization, nor has there been any claim that Venezuela carried out or threatened an armed attack against the United States.

Some have argued that President Maduro’s government lacks legitimacy due to disputed elections. However, international law draws a clear distinction between political legitimacy and legal authority. The International Court of Justice has consistently held that disagreements over governance or electoral credibility do not justify military intervention. This principle was firmly established in the Nicaragua v. United States judgment, where the Court ruled that political disagreements cannot excuse the use of force or interference in another state’s internal affairs.

The United States has attempted to characterize its actions as a law enforcement operation, describing the Venezuelan president as a fugitive from American justice. Yet international law does not permit states to conduct military arrests of foreign heads of state under the guise of criminal enforcement. Criminal accountability is ordinarily pursued through extradition, international judicial mechanisms, or cooperative legal processes, not through unilateral military force on foreign soil.

Historical experience offers sobering lessons. The United States invasion of Panama in 1989, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999, and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 each demonstrate how powerful states have stretched or bypassed international legal norms, often facing condemnation and long-term political and legal consequences. These episodes weakened respect for the UN Charter and contributed to skepticism about the effectiveness of a rules-based international order.

The danger of such actions lies not only in the immediate conflict but also in the precedent they establish. If unilateral military interventions become normalized, the international system risks sliding back into a power-based order in which military strength determines legality. This development would be particularly damaging for developing and smaller states, whose sovereignty depends heavily on the continued enforcement of international legal constraints.

Ultimately, the intervention in Venezuela is not merely a regional or political dispute; it is a critical test of whether international law continues to restrain the use of force or yields to geopolitical expediency. The outcome of this debate will shape not only the future of Venezuela but also the credibility and relevance of the international legal order itself.